Technology Dynamics Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) is a communication technology that can identify specific targets and read and write related data through radio signals without identifying the system to establish mechanical or optical contact with specific targets. RFID has become a major challenge in the application of RFID in various aspects of life. Researchers at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and Texas Instruments (TI) have adopted three major design techniques to solve the “bypass attack†problem most frequently faced by RFID tag chips and significantly increase the security of RFID.
U.S. Schools and Enterprises Collaborate to Solve RFID Bypass Attacks to Improve Security
Bypass attack is to obtain the key information (such as power consumption, electromagnetic radiation, and duration) leaked by the key device during encryption and decryption operations, and analyze the key key using statistical processing methods. The bypass attack is based on the correlation between the physical information released when the encryption device performs calculations and the operations performed and the data it operates. It is independent of the specific hardware device and encryption algorithm, and has the characteristics of high attack efficiency and simple implementation.
One encryption/decryption process can only reveal a small amount of information. To obtain a complete key, multiple encryption/decryption processes need to be performed on the same key to obtain enough leakage information. To do this, the researchers added a random sequence generator to the RFID tag chip. After each transaction, the researchers will change the key, run the same sequence generator on the central server, and perform legal verification before reading the RFID chip information. Verification.
Because RFID tags are mainly powered by readers, the method of adding random sequence generators still cannot cope with “power glitch attacks,†which means that attackers cut off power supply before new keys are generated, so that the chip can resume power supply. Old keys will still be used afterwards. By repeating the operation, the attacker can force the chip to work under the same key until it accumulates enough information that can be used for the bypass attack. To this end, the researchers took two actions. One was to add "on-chip power" to ensure continuous power supply, and the other was to use non-volatile memory cells to store the data that the chip was processing before the power was turned off.
In terms of "on-chip power", the researchers used a set of 3.3V capacitors to store power. After the power is cut off (the reader is removed), the chip can still perform multiple scheduled operations and then send the data to 571 different 1.5V memory locations. After power is restored, the 3.3V capacitor is first charged, then the data previously sent to the 1.5V memory is retrieved, and the previously interrupted operation is resumed, thereby rendering the "power pulse attack" ineffective.
In terms of non-volatile memory cells, researchers used ferromagnetic crystals. The central atom can move in the crystal along the direction of the electric field when an external electric field is applied, and cause a charge breakdown when passing through the energy barrier. The breakdown can be induced and recorded by the internal circuit. When the electric field is removed, the central atom remains stationary. Realize non-volatile storage of data. TI is one of the world's leading manufacturers of Ferroelectric Random Access Memory (FRAM).
Although each time when power is restored, the 3.3V capacitor must first be charged and the previously unfinished calculations completed. However, after testing, the chip can still achieve a reading speed of 30 times per second, which is faster than most RFIDs in the current stage. chip.
TI has produced prototypes of the chip and achieved expectations by testing its anti-intrusion performance. The research results have been demonstrated at the 2016 International Solid State Circuit Conference (ISSCC). The research was funded by TI and Japan's Denso.
U.S. Schools and Enterprises Collaborate to Solve RFID Bypass Attacks to Improve Security
Bypass attack is to obtain the key information (such as power consumption, electromagnetic radiation, and duration) leaked by the key device during encryption and decryption operations, and analyze the key key using statistical processing methods. The bypass attack is based on the correlation between the physical information released when the encryption device performs calculations and the operations performed and the data it operates. It is independent of the specific hardware device and encryption algorithm, and has the characteristics of high attack efficiency and simple implementation.
One encryption/decryption process can only reveal a small amount of information. To obtain a complete key, multiple encryption/decryption processes need to be performed on the same key to obtain enough leakage information. To do this, the researchers added a random sequence generator to the RFID tag chip. After each transaction, the researchers will change the key, run the same sequence generator on the central server, and perform legal verification before reading the RFID chip information. Verification.
Because RFID tags are mainly powered by readers, the method of adding random sequence generators still cannot cope with “power glitch attacks,†which means that attackers cut off power supply before new keys are generated, so that the chip can resume power supply. Old keys will still be used afterwards. By repeating the operation, the attacker can force the chip to work under the same key until it accumulates enough information that can be used for the bypass attack. To this end, the researchers took two actions. One was to add "on-chip power" to ensure continuous power supply, and the other was to use non-volatile memory cells to store the data that the chip was processing before the power was turned off.
In terms of "on-chip power", the researchers used a set of 3.3V capacitors to store power. After the power is cut off (the reader is removed), the chip can still perform multiple scheduled operations and then send the data to 571 different 1.5V memory locations. After power is restored, the 3.3V capacitor is first charged, then the data previously sent to the 1.5V memory is retrieved, and the previously interrupted operation is resumed, thereby rendering the "power pulse attack" ineffective.
In terms of non-volatile memory cells, researchers used ferromagnetic crystals. The central atom can move in the crystal along the direction of the electric field when an external electric field is applied, and cause a charge breakdown when passing through the energy barrier. The breakdown can be induced and recorded by the internal circuit. When the electric field is removed, the central atom remains stationary. Realize non-volatile storage of data. TI is one of the world's leading manufacturers of Ferroelectric Random Access Memory (FRAM).
Although each time when power is restored, the 3.3V capacitor must first be charged and the previously unfinished calculations completed. However, after testing, the chip can still achieve a reading speed of 30 times per second, which is faster than most RFIDs in the current stage. chip.
TI has produced prototypes of the chip and achieved expectations by testing its anti-intrusion performance. The research results have been demonstrated at the 2016 International Solid State Circuit Conference (ISSCC). The research was funded by TI and Japan's Denso.
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